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Distribution Channel, Matching, and Welfare Asymmetry
in the Korean Insurance Industry:
A Hint from Matching Theory
Yong-Ju Lee*

Based on the observation that insurance companies in Korea, unlike those in other financial sectors
and those in other countries, dominantly use the agent-based push-type marketing strategy, this
paper hypothesizes that difference in distribution systems originating from characteristics of financial
products can lead to welfare asymmetry between financial institutions and customers, merely due to
their financial matching. For this analysis, we employ a simple matching theoretic model, try to
understand the welfare implications of distribution systems from a matching theoretic perspective,
and analyze the bottom of negative perceptions of insurance industry. The proposed model suggests
that this welfare asymmetry derives mainly from financial matching through the distribution systems,
which implies that any efforts to improve the insurance industry must consider changes in the matching
process, namely the distribution system. We hope that this paper complements and extends the
existing literature on insurance distribution systems in terms of methodologies and research subjects.
Key words: Distribution Systems, Financial Matching, Welfare Asymmetry, Insurance Industry

problem is urgent particularly in the insurance

Ⅰ. Introduction

industry. For instance, as shown in Figure 1,
the Customer Experience Index (CEI) for Korea
One of the most serious issues in the Korean

(60.9 in 2012 and 62.8 in 2013) is far lower

financial industry is its negative perception of

than the global average (67.5 in 2012 and 69.4

finance and financial services institutions and

in 2013). In addition, the measure of customer

this issue has been a matter of grave concern

trust (3.72) in the insurance industry is lower

for senior managers and policymakers. This

than that (4.1) in the banking industry (Figure 2).
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<Figure 1> The Customer Experience Index (CEI), by country (2012-2013)

Source: Capgemini’s (2014) World Insurance Report.

Unfavorable judgments about insurance com-

tors and have been corrected over a long period

panies clearly stem from bad practices, such as

of time. That is, there may be something fun-

unsatisfactory claim services, sticky-down dis-

damental beyond the usual explanation and

count rates, a refusal to accept customers in

therefore the following question motivates this

need of insurance services, and unfair practices

study: What is in the fundamental cause of

such as collusion among insurance companies,

negative views on insurance and the insurance

among others. However, it remains unclear

industry?

whether these are really the main source of

The insurance industry differs from other fi-

unfavorable perceptions because such bad prac-

nancial industries in many dimensions, partic-

tices can be easily found in other financial sec-

ularly in terms of product distribution systems.
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<Figure 2> Customer trust

Source: The Korea Insurance Research Institute (2013. N=1,200, out of 5)

A wide variety of distribution methods have

products (i.e., policies) are difficult to ascertain

been used in the insurance industry, including

due to the complexity of contracts, the con-

the use of a professional employee sales force,

tingent nature of many services (e.g., claim

independent sales representatives, and direct

handling and payment), and the fact that many

response methods such as mail and telephone

services are provided over time. This implies

solicitation. However, one common characteristic

that the quality of insurance products is diffi-

is that distribution methods represent the in-

cult to ascertain in advance of their purchase

strument of positive “solicitation” by insurance

and this may be so even after customers build

companies. The ongoing technological revolu-

substantial product experience. On top of con-

tion in the financial services industry has led to

sumers’ limited opportunities to observe many

substantial change in the distribution system,

aspects of product quality, the nature of in-

but this typical characteristic of company-so-

surance policies and their pricing is such that

licitation marketing methods remains dominant

information may be difficult to compare across

in the Korean insurance industry.

consumers. Given this circumstance, customers

This characteristic, which derives from char-

are not likely to have favorable purchase in-

acteristics of insurance products, can become

tentions toward insurance products, and in-

clearer if insurance companies are compared

surance providers may have no choice but to

with banks. Quality characteristics of insurance

engage in “push-type” marketing.1) In addition,

1) Marketing theory distinguishes between two main types of promotional strategies; “push” and “pull.” The “push-type”
strategy makes use of a company’s sales force and trade promotion activities to directly create consumer demand for a
product. On the other hand, a “pull-type” strategy requires high spending on advertising and consumer promotion to
build consumer demand for a product.
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because of consultation required before the

spective of matching theory and discusses the

purchase and regular advisory services required

reason behind negative perceptions of insurance.

over the contract period, agent-based distribution

Our hypothesis is that differences in distribution

systems have traditionally been advantageous

systems from characteristics of products, in the

for both sides. For this reason, this study de-

financial industry produce welfare asymmetry

fines the insurance industry to have a company-

between financial institutions and their customers.

proposing characteristic, in which companies first

Figure 3 illustrates this logic.

approach target customers and then persuade

In addition, what is the relationship between

them to buy products. On the other hand, banks

matching theory and insurance? How can this

employ “pull-type” marketing strategies by

study be matched to the insurance industry?

showing the comparative advantage of their

At first glance, these two fields seem s to have

products and inducing customers to buy their

no relationship. However, a simple model based

products. Because products of banks are rela-

on matching theory, so-called two-sided match-

tively simple to understand by customers, branch-

ing, has a profound implication on the insurance

based distribution channels have traditionally

industry, particularly on that of Korea. This

been considered a typical distribution system.

approach may inspire policymakers and top man-

Table 1 summarizes these arguments.

agers of insurance companies struggling to cope

This study examines the effects of these

with deep-seated negative views on insurance.

characteristics of insurance products and dis-

This study contributes to the literature by

tinct marketing strategies on customer welfare.

suggesting and illustrating a new approach to

For this purpose, the study provides important

the analysis of the financial distribution system

welfare implications of financial matching char-

and its effects on welfare asymmetry in the fi-

acterized by distribution systems from the per-

nancial industry. The existing insurance liter-

<Table 1> Insurance companies Vs. banks
Insurance companies
Properties of products
Typical examples
Complexity of products
Recognition of product utility

Banks

health insurance, life insurance
highly complex
contingent on the event

deposits and loans
relatively simple and automatic
on a real time basis

Marketing type

Push-type
(approach and persuade)

Pull-type
(show and attract)

Traditional distribution channel

Agent-based

Branch-based

Matching procedure

Company-proposing

Customer-proposing
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<Figure 3> Welfare implications of the insurance distribution system

Complexity and other characteristics of insurance products
↓
Marketing strategy
↓
Distribution channel
↓
Financial matching
↓
Welfare asymmetry
ature has analyzed insurance distribution sys-

search on matching theory.

tems based on three major economic issues:

This paper makes some meaningful contributions

the problem of distribution system choice, the

from policy-related, regulatory aspects. The re-

nature of the insurer-agent relationship (the

sults show that there is more to something than

principal-agent problem), and regulatory issues

meets the eye by demonstrating that customers

in insurance distribution activities (Etgar (1976),

face welfare asymmetry without realizing it.

Berger et al. (1997) Dionne (2000), Klumpes

The proposed model illustrates that this wel-

and Stefan (2011)). The marketing literature

fare asymmetry originates mainly from the fi-

has examined the concept of trust in the con-

nancial matching protocol through distribution

text of channel management and focused on

systems, which implies that any efforts to im-

measuring trust in the relationship between

prove the insurance industry should consider

salespeople and customers in the service sector

changes in the matching process, namely the

(Dwyer et al. (1987), Andaleeb (1992), Ganesan

distribution system.

(1994), Doney and Cannon (1997), Fletcher and

The rest of this paper is organized as follows.

Peters (1997)). This study complements and

Section 2 introduces the simple theoretic model,

extends the existing literature on insurance

namely the marriage model, which describes

distribution systems in terms of methodologies

the simple matching process between insurance

and research subjects. Although this study does

companies and customers in the market. Section

not consider classical topics, it demonstrates the

3 extends to insurance market and discusses

wide applicability of matching theory to seem-

important implications. Section 4 concludes with

ingly unrelated topics through a simple model.

a discussion of recent trends in the insurance

In addition, it illustrates a new stream of re-

market and their implications for insurance dis-
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wp} is the set of women. Each man has prefer-

tribution systems.

ences over women, and each woman has preferences over men. To express these preferences

Ⅱ. Summary of the Literature

concisely, preferences of each man mi are represented by an order list of preferences, P(mi),
on the set W∪{mi}. That is, preferences of mi

This section examines the simplest form of

may have the form P(mi) = w1, w2, w3, mi,

the matching market, which is often referred

w4, w5, … , wp indicating that his first choice is

to as the “marriage model.” This section pro-

to be married to w1, his second choice is to

vides a systematic summary of the existing lit-

married to w2, his third choice is w3, and his

erature on matching theory, which is closely

fourth choice is to remain single. Similarly, each

related and applicable to the insurance market

woman wj has an ordered list of preferences,

in Korea. There appears to be no relationship

P(wj), on the set M∪{wj}. We will denote by

between marriage and insurance, but from the

P the set of preference lists P = {P(m1), … ,

perspective of matching theory, there may be

P(mn), P(w1), … , P(wp)}, one for each man

an argument based on the fact that both are

and woman. We write wi > m wj to mean m

obviously involved in two-sided matching. Two-

prefers wi to wj. Economists customarily make

sided matching is involved in markets with

two assumptions about the preferences of an

two sides that require matching with each other,

individual. The first is that preferences are

such as firms and workers, students and schools,

complete, which means that any two alter-

and men and women. A marriage market is

natives can be compared. The second is that

briefly described based on Roth and Sotomayor

the preferences are transitive, which means that

(1992), and then the results applicable to the

if A is preferred to B, and if B is preferred to

explanation of financial matching in the in-

C, then A is preferred to C. Preferences are

surance market are discussed. Although the

called rational if the preferences possess these

marriage model is a simple model that enables

two properties. The question posed by the mar-

direct conclusions about the insurance market,

riage model is then the following: Given the

its applicability becomes clear through an anal-

preferences of individuals involved, what type of

ysis of the insurance market later.

outcome results from their collective interaction?

Based on Roth and Sotomayor (1992), a spe-

An outcome of the marriage model is a set

cific marriage market is denoted by the triple

of marriages. A matching μ is the one-to-one

{M, W: P}, where M = {m1, m2, m3, … , mn}

correspondence from the set M∪W onto itself

is the set of men, and W = {w1, w2, w3, … ,

of order two such that if μ(m)≠m, then μ(m)

94 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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∈W, and if μ(w)≠w, then μ(w)∈M. We

depending on their preferences and women are

refer to μ(x) as the mate of x. Each individual’s

able to keep the best available man at any step

preferences over alternative matchings correspond

engaged, without accepting him outright. Until the

exactly to his or her preferences over his or her

stable matching is made, this process continues.

own mates at the two matchings. Therefore,
mi, say, prefers matching μ to matching ν if

Example. The set of preference lists, P =

and only if he prefers μ(mi) to ν(mi). Woman

{P(m1), … , P(mn), P(w1), … , P(wp)}, is

w is acceptable to man m if he likes her at

given. And suppose that proposals are made by

least as well as remaining single. If an individual

men.

is not indifferent between any two acceptable
alternatives, he or she has strict preferences.
The matching μ is individually rational if
each individual is acceptable to his or her mate.
Consider a matching μ such that there exist a
man m and a woman w who are not matched

P(m1) = w1, w2, w3, w4
P(m2) = w4, w2, w3, w1
P(m3) = w4, w3, w1, w2
P(m4) = w1, w4, w3, w2
P(m5) = w1, w2, w4

to their mates at μ. That is, suppose that w >m

P(w1) = m2, m3, m1, m4, m5
P(w2) = m3, m1, m2, m4, m5
P(w3) = m5, m4, m1, m2, m3

μ(m) and m >w μ(w). The man and woman

P(w4) = m1, m4, m5, m2, m3

to one another at μ, but who prefer each other

(m,w) will be said to block the matching μ.
This state of matching would be unstable in

Step 1: m1, m4, m5 propose to w1, and m2, m3

the sense that man m and woman w would

propose to w4. Here w1 rejects m4 and m5 and

have good reason to disrupt it in order to marry

keeps m1 engaged, and, w4 rejects m3 and

each other, and the rules of the game allow

keeps m2 engaged:

them to do so. A matching μ is stable if it is
not blocked by any individual or any pair of
individuals.
Before proceeding, there is a need to address
the following fundamental question: Does stable matching always exist? Here the answer is
affirmative. There always exists at least one
matching that is stable. Although we can prove
this in the rigorous manner, we illustrate it by

w1
m1

w2

w3

w4
m2

Step 2: m3, m4, and m5 propose to their second
choice, namely w3, w4, and w2, respectively; w4
rejects m2 and keeps m4 engaged:
w1
m1

w2
m5

w3
m3

w4
m4

an example. Suppose that men propose to women
Distribution Channel, Matching, and Welfare Asymmetry in the Korean Insurance Industry: A Hint from Matching Theory 95

Step 3: m2 proposes to his second choice, w2,

class of two-sided markets.

who rejects m5 and keeps m2 engaged:
w1
m1

w2
m2

w3
m3

Definition. For a given marriage market {M,

w4
m4

W: P}, a stable matching μ is M-optimal if
every man likes it at least as well as any other

Step 4: m5 propose to his third choice, w4,
who rejects m5 and continues with m4 engaged.
Since m5 has been rejected by every woman
on his list, he stays single, and the stable
matching obtained is:
w1
m1

w2
m2

w3
m3

stable matching; that is, if for every other stable matching μ’, μ ≥M μ’. Similarly, a stable
matching ν is W-optimal if every woman likes
it at least as well as any other stable matching; that is, if for every other stable matching
ν ’, ν ≥W ν’.

w4
m4

(m5)
m5

Each individual compares alternative matchings in terms of his or her preferences for his

Call this matching μM to show that it is a

or her own mates at those matchings. Therefore,

result from the procedure where proposals are

in examining the set of stable matchings, an

made by men.

individual is involved in comparing those mates

Since men and women play precisely sym-

whom he or she might have at some stable

metrical roles in the marriage market, we could

matching. Define a woman w and a man m to

have described another way in which the roles

be achievable for each other in a marriage

of men and women were reversed. The stable

market {M, W: P} if m and w are paired at

matching obtained when the women propose to

some stable matching.

the men, denoted by μW, is
w4

w1

w2

w3

(m5)

m1

m2

m3

m4

m5

Theorem 1 (Gale and Shapley, 1962). When
all men and women have strict preferences, there
■

Note in the Example that all men like μM at
least as well as μW, and all the women prefer
μW to μM. The observation in Example might
just be an accident. It, however, turned out not
to be an accident. This is one of the most surprising and important discoveries about the

96 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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always exists an M-optimal stable matching,
and a W-optimal stable matching. Furthermore
the matching μM produced by ProposalEngagement-Marriage Procedure with men
proposing is the Men-optimal stable matching.
The W-optimal stable matching is the matching
μW produced when the women propose.

Proof: When all men and women have strict
2)

Thus, when preferences are strict, the in-

preferences, we will show that no man is ever

dividuals on one side of the market have a

rejected by an achievable woman. Consequently

common interest regarding the set of stable

the stable matching μM matches each man to

matchings, since they are in agreement on the

his most preferred achievable woman, and is

best stable matching. It turns out that individuals

therefore the unique M-optimal stable matching.

on the opposite sides of the market have oppo-

The proof is by induction. Assume that up to

site interests in this regard, and the optimal

a given step in the procedure no man has yet

stable matching for one side of the market is

been rejected by a woman who is achievable

the worst stable matching for individuals on the

for him. At this step, suppose woman w rejects

other side of the market. Let μ >M μ’ denote

man m. If she rejects m as unacceptable, then

that all men like μ at least as well as μ’, with

she is unacceptable for him, and we are done.

at least one man preferring μ to μ’ outright.

If she rejects m in favor of man m’, whom she
keeps engaged, then she prefers m’ to m. We
must show that w is not achievable for m.

Theorem 2 (Knuth(1976). Recited from Roth
and Sotomayor (1992)). When all individuals

We know m’ prefers to w to any woman ex-

have strict preferences, the M-optimal stable

cept for those who have previously rejected him,

matching is the worst stable matching for the

and hence are unachievable for him. Consider a

women; that is, μ > M μ’ if and only if μ’ > W μ.

hypothetical matching μ that matches m to w
and everyone else to an achievable mate. Then

Proof: Let μ and μ’ be stable matchings

m’ prefers w to his mate at μ. So the matching

such that μ > M μ’. We will show that μ’ > W

μ is unstable, since it is blocked by m’ and w,

μ. Suppose it is not true that μ’ > W μ. Then

who each prefer the other to their mate μ.

there must be some woman w who prefers μ

Therefore there is no stable matching that

to μ’. Then woman w has a different mate at

matches m and w, and so they are unachievable

μ and μ’, and consequently so does the man

for each other, which completes the proof.

m= μ(w). Since man m also has strict pref-

■

2) There are clearly many reasons to expect that agents may not have the ability to distinguish between all alternatives.
Perhaps the most important reason is that agents may have little information on some alternatives, and thus are
indifferent between them. However, in situations where agents have a great deal of information, we might even consider
the case in which they have strict preferences to be typical. Loosely speaking, the reason is that indifference is in some
sense a “knife-edge” phenomenon. That is, if an agent is indifferent between two alternatives, then a small improvement
in one of them would presumably cause him or her to prefer it to the other. However, if an agent clearly prefers one
alternative to another, then a sufficiently small improvement in the less preferred alternative will presumably leave
preferences unchanged. In this sense, a situation with strict preferences is more robust and less special than that with
indifference (Roth and Sotomayor (1992)).
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erences, m and w form a blocking pair for

posal, given the competition among your set I.”

the matching μ’. This contradicts the assump-

Here redefine the sets {I, C}. What happens if

tion that μ’ is stable. Therefore μ’ > W μ, as

the set I is a set of representative sales agent

required.

of insurance companies and the set C is the

■

set of insurance customers? Then turn to inIt should be noted that in Theorems 1 and 2

surance matching between insurance compa-

we have supposed that all individuals have

nies and insurance customers. The objective of

strict preferences. If some individuals are indif-

this section is to show that insurance market

ferent between possible mates, we may introduce

basically has properties of company-proposing

some fixed tie-breaking rule like alphabetical

model, and therefore produce company-optimal

order of the name. Also we think that this as-

matching as defined above. For this purpose,

sumption is neither a big restriction nor a spe-

there is a need to clearly answer to the ques-

cial case. If an individual is indifferent between

tions of whether the marriage model is directly

two alternatives, a small improvement in one

applicable to the insurance market and whether

of them would presumably cause him or her to

the results of the marriage model still remain

prefer it to the other. Sometimes indifference is

valid. Surprisingly, as will be discussed later,

regarded as a knife edge phenomenon in this

arguments and results work in the same man-

sense.

ner as in the marriage market.

Ⅲ. Application to the Korean
Insurance Market

3.1 Application of the Marriage
Model to the Insurance Matching
As mentioned earlier, the insurance industry
employs a typical company-solicitation, push-

Consider informally the marriage model again.

type marketing strategy based on agent-based

Suppose that two sets of individuals {I, C}

distribution systems. Although the ongoing

have strict preferences. Here those individuals

technological revolution in the financial services

in the set I and told to “Point to your most

industry has led to substantial change in dis-

preferred objects in the set C.” Then they may

tribution systems, the proposition that the in-

point to more than one partner. However, sup-

surance industry basically has properties of

pose instead that they are told to “Be realistic,

Company-proposing model is still dominant.

and point to your most preferred object among

Then there remain some theoretical issues on

those who might actually agree to your pro-

the application of the marriage model to the

98 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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such that each customer is matched to at most

insurance market.
Consider the insurance market of a specific
insurance product, not the whole insurance

one company, and each company is matched to
around its target sales quantity of customers.

market. And let’s think of a contract between

The second issue is that insurance companies

a company and a customer as a matching be-

are assumed to have preferences over individual

tween them. There are clear similarities be-

customers. That is, they are able to rank order

tween the insurance market and the simple

the customers who have applied to them for

marriage market. There are two types of play-

contracts. Insurance companies are publicly

ers, companies and customers, and the function

known to all customers, so each customer has

of the market is to match them. The major

preferences over insurance companies. But we

difference from the marriage model is that each

should justify how companies have preferences

insurance company can accommodate more than

over individual customers. First, suppose a pure

one customer, although each customer takes

theoretic market where sales agents and custom-

only one product. Assume that customers buy

ers know each other, allowing for some conflict

a single insurance policy for a single risk. That

between the reality and theory. Historically in-

is, the insurance market is of many-to-one

surance companies operated locally. Agents knew

matching rather than one-to-one matching. This

customers and their goal was to only insure

issue is easily overcome with a little computation.

people of sound health and of sober habit. Second,

For this reason, we introduce a set of positive

this assumption is fit for the existing market

integers q(I) called the target sale quantity

for new products where agents already own

of company I, is introduced to indicate the op-

customers’ list accumulated by the previous sales

3)

timally planned number of contracts it offers.

activities. Actually insurance companies com-

A well-organized and profit maximizing insurance

pile tons of personal information on customers

company must screen the potential population

through several channels online or offline.4) Thanks

of insurance customers and set the target sales

to the existence of several kinds of data collec-

volume in advance. When we denote a partic-

tors from whom insurance companies buy cus-

ular company Ii, its target sale will be denoted

tomer information, insurance companies com-

q(i). An outcome of the insurance matching

pete against each other for common customers

model is a matching of customers to companies,

from the same database. If it is still unsat-

3) The simplest treatment is to set the target number to be equal to the number of the whole customers.
4) In the U.S., insurance companies can use several types of information: (1) customer’s credit information from the credit
bureaus such as Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion , (2) insurance claim information by data brokers, (3) health history
information from sources such as the MIB consumer file database.
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isfactory, just assume that the model describe

The last issue arises in the equilibrium concept.

a local, or peculiar phenomenon, which is prev-

A matching μ is (pairwise) stable if it is not

alent in Korea, where the troops of housewives

blocked by any individual player or any company-

working for insurance companies as a sales agent

customer pair. At a glance, it is not obvious

approach to acquaintances.

that this definition will be adequate, since now

Although we have described companies’ pref-

we might consider coalitions consisting of a

erences over customers, each company with a

company and several customers, or even coali-

target sales volume greater than one must be

tions consisting of multiple companies and

able to compare groups of students in order to

customers. We call a matching μ group stable

compare alternative matchings as in the mar-

if it is not blocked by any coalition.5)

riage model. Until we have described companies’ preferences over matchings, our model will
not be a well-defined game. So we should have

Theorem 3. A matching is group stable if
and only if it is (pairwise) stable.

defined the concept of responsive preferences
over groups of customers. Surprisingly, how-

Proof: If μ is unstable via an individual

ever, it is well known that we will only need

customer or company, or via a customer-company

to assume that companies have strict prefer-

pair, then it is clearly group unstable via the

ences over individual customer, as in the mar-

coalition consisting of the same singleton or

riage model. The reason for this is, even if it is

pair. In the other direction, if μ is blocked via

not easy to understand, that when companies

coalition Ω and outcome μ’, let I be in Ω.

have strict preferences over customers, then

Then the fact that μ’(I) >I μ(I) implies that

they are not indifferent between any groups of

there exists a customer c in μ’(I) - μ(I) and

customers assigned to them at stable match-

a d in μ(I) – μ’(I) such that c >I d. So c is

ings, even though they may be indifferent be-

in Ω and c prefers I to μ(c), so μ is unstable

tween other groups of customers. That is, if

via c and I.

■

companies have strict preferences over individuals,
then companies have strict preferences over those

This says that the instabilities that can arise

groups of customers that they may be assigned

from coalitions of any size can be identified by

at stable matchings. (Roth and Sotomayor, 1989)

examining only small coalitions. And more, it

5) Although our model takes the cooperative approach and employs the concept of stability as an equilibrium, our model can
be easily transformed to a noncooperative game. So if the quota is big enough (even though smaller than the entire
market), customer can be patient, i.e., wait until receiving offers from all companies. This should be customer’s dominant
strategy.
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says that stable and group stable matchings

way in describing the preferences of the cus-

can be identified using only the preferences P

tomers, who are in fact indifferent between the

over individuals, that is, without knowing the

different positions at each company that are

※

preferences P (I) that each company has over

now each represented as a separate players. In

groups of customers.

order not to complicate the exposition about

All the issues examined above suggests that

the results for which the assumption of strict

the insurance matching model may be very

preferences is important, we will assume that

similar to the marriage model, and that many

each customer’s preference list is modified by

of the results obtained for the marriage model

replacing I, wherever it appears on his or her

will generalize immediately to the insurance

list, by the string i1, i2,…, iq(I), in that order.

matching.

If the preferences over individuals are strict,
then there is a natural one-to-one correspondence

3.2 A Related Marriage Market

between matchings in the original insurance
matching problem and matchings in the mar-

Consider a particular insurance matching prob-

riage market derived from it in this way. That

lem in which companies I = {I1, I2, …, In} have

is, a matching μ of the insurance matching

target sales q(1), q(2), …, q(n), and custom-

problem, which matches a company I with the

ers C = {C1, C2, …, Cp}. Here the preferences

customers in μ(I), corresponds to the match-

of customers and companies over individuals

ing μ’ in the related marriage market in which

are given by P = {P(I1), … , P(In), P(C1), … ,

the customers in μ(I) are matched, in the order

P(Cp)}.

that they occur in the preferences P(I), with

Now consider a related marriage market, in

the ordered positions of I that appear in the

which each company I with target sale q(I) is

related marriage market. Thus a matching of

broken into q(I) pieces of itself such that in

the insurance matching problem is stable if

the related market, the players are customers

and only if the corresponding matchings of the

and company positions, each having a target

related marriage market are stable.

sale of one. That is, we replace company I by

Differences between the insurance matching

q(I) positions of I denoted by i1, i2,…, iq(I) .

problem and the marriage market appear in

Each of these positions has preferences over

different ways depending on whether results

individual customers that are identical with those

are viewed based on the structure of a set of

of I. Since each position i has a target sale of

stable matching. Since stable machings can be

one, we do not need to consider its preferences

identified without regard to preferences of com-

over group of customers. We have some lee-

panies over groups of customers, we confine our
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attention to the set of stable matchings.

The results specified above says that the in-

Now we are ready to establish some results

surance matching market with company-pro-

for the insurance matching problem. We con-

posing produces a company-optimal stable

tinue to assume that all preferences are strict.

matching, which is the worst stable matching

As in the marriage model, a matching mecha-

for the customers. This completes the purpose

nism in the related marriage market by deferred

of this paper.

acceptance with company-proposing produces a
company-optimal stable matching. Note again
that we write μ >I μ’ to mean μ(I) ≥ I μ’(I)

Ⅳ. Conclusion

for all I ∈ I and then μ(I) > I μ’(I) for some

I ∈ I.
Negative perceptions of insurance have been
Theorem 4. If μ and μ’ are stable match-

an important issue for senior managers of in-

ings for {I, C: P} then μ >I μ’ if and only if

surance companies as well as policymakers.

μ’ > C μ.

However, this study shows that there is something else beyond the absolute level of bad

Proof: Suppose that μ(I) ≥I μ’(I) for all I

practices. Based on the observation that in-

∈ I and μ(I) > I μ’(I) for some I ∈ I. This

surance companies in Korea still make domi-

is equivalent to μ(in) ≥ in μ’(in) for all in ∈

nant use of agent-based push-type marketing

I’ and μ(im) > im μ’(im) for some im ∈ I’,

strategy, we employ a matching theoretic model,

when μ and μ’ be the stable matchings cor-

and try to understand the welfare implications

responding to μ and μ’ in the related mar-

of insurance distribution systems from a match-

riage market {I’, C: P’}. This in turn is sat-

ing theoretic perspective.

isfied if and only if μ > I’ μ’ and hence, if and

The results for the model indicate that wel-

only if μ’ > C μ by Theorem 3, which implies

fare asymmetry in the insurance industry orig-

μ’ >C μ.

inates mainly from the financial matching proc-

■

ess through the distribution system between
This of course has the following immediate

customers and insurance companies. Then why
does the insurance industry have this type of

corollary.

special distribution system? This study conCorollary 5. The optimal stable matching on

jecture that this is due to characteristics of in-

one side of the market {I, C: P} is the worst

surance products. Quality characteristics of in-

stable matching for the other.

surance products are difficult to ascertain be-
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cause of the complexity of contract, the con-

tionships between insurers and agents based on

tingent nature of many services provided. Therefore,

industry traditions, toward more flexible systems

customers are reluctant to pay for some unre-

in which distribution methods are determined

alized future risk. Given this circumstance, cus-

by products and customer groups. In accord-

tomers are not likely to move first to purchase

ance with the development of platform busi-

insurance products, and insurance sellers may

nesses such as online marketing and independent

have no choice but to engage in “push-type”

agents, the use of company-proposing is likely

marketing. And thanks to both explanations

to decrease in the near future. In this regard,

needed before purchase and regular advisory

future research should determine whether cus-

services needed over the contract period, an

tomers’ negative perceptions decrease with the

agent-based distribution system has tradition-

diversification of distribution systems. We leave

ally been advantageous.

this for future research.

This study makes some meaningful contributions

This study makes another contribution to the

to the literature from policy and regulatory

literature by proposing and illustrating a new

perspectives. This study suggests that there is

approach to the analysis of the financial dis-

more to something than meets the eye by showing

tribution system and its effects on welfare in

that customers face welfare asymmetry with-

the industry. The study innovatively comple-

out even realizing it. This implies that efforts

ments and extends the existing literature on

to improve in the insurance industry must con-

insurance distribution systems in terms of meth-

sider changes in the matching process, namely

odologies and research subjects. To the authors’

the distribution system. That is, a regulatory

knowledge, no study has employed matching

policy must induce insurance companies to di-

theory to analyze the insurance industry. In this

versify their distribution systems away from

regard, this study contributes to the literature

agent-based ones, make insurance products easy

by demonstrating the robust applicability of

to understand, and design products in the man-

matching theory arguments to seemingly un-

ner that customers can recognize their value of

related topics through a simple model and thus

insurance products in their daily life. Recently

suggesting a new stream of research based on

two important trends are becoming visible in

matching theory.

insurance marketing relationships: the use of
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multiple distribution systems within a single
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firm, and the increased specialization of roles of
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different distribution systems. The industry has
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